Risks

The following are risks that everyone should be aware of before interacting with the Juicebox V4 omnichain protocol. The protocol's design exposes these risks in consequence to its normal operating procedures.

1. Smart contract risk

The protocol runs entirely on public smart contracts explained in detail throughout these docs. The Juicebox protocol is public infrastructure running well-known code, all consequences from interacting with networks running the protocol are borne by the entities who sign each transaction. The protocol works according to the specifications outlined in these docs to the extent the code is written and deployed correctly, which is a collective responsibility and not guaranteed. There is a major risk that this is not the case. Please do your own research.

2. Project owner risk

Ownership of each project on the Juicebox protocol belongs to the address possessing a JBProjects NFT with a unique token ID, which also serves as the project's ID. The address that owns this token can reconfigure a project's rulesets, which empower it to manipulate a project's finances both productively and maliciously.

The following values can be reconfigured by a project's owner on a per-funding cycle basis:

• 2.1 Setting a distribution limit and payout splits

  With a distribution limit of zero, all treasury funds either stay locked or can be reclaimed by token holders. If the project's current ruleset's redemption bonding curve rate allows it, token holders can cash out their tokens to reclaim their share of the treasury.

  A non-zero distribution limit earmarks a portion of the treasury for distribution to payout splits.

  A project owner can also change the split allocations that are bound by the ruleset's distribution limit at any time, unless the split was explicitly locked until a specified date during its creation.

  🟢 Used productively, a distribution limit can be used to withdraw funds to a community wallet, distribute funds to contributors, channel funds to other projects operating treasuries on the protocol, or fund anything else that can be expressed as a smart contract.

  🔴 Used maliciously this can be used to rug the treasury into an arbitrary wallet.

• 2.2 Setting a surplus allowance

  With a surplus allowance of zero, all treasury funds belonging to the community – funds in excess of the distribution limit – cannot be accessed by the project owner. The only way funds can leave the treasury is through token cash outs.

  A non-zero surplus allowance gives the project owner access to a portion of the community's funds for on-demand distribution to arbitrary addresses.

  🟢 Used productively this can be used to manage discretionary spending.

  🔴 Used maliciously this can be used to rug the treasury into an arbitrary wallet.

• 2.3 Allowing project owner token minting

  While allowing project owner token minting is not allowed, the only way for new project tokens to be minted and distributed is for the project to receive new funds into its treasury. Tokens will get minted in accordance to the current ruleset.

  If token minting is allowed, an arbitrary number of tokens can be minted and distributed by the project owner, possibly diluting the redemption value of all outstanding tokens.

  🟢 Used productively this can be used to premint tokens to members, or satisfy other agreed upon inflationary treasury strategies.

  🔴 Used maliciously this can be used to mint extra tokens and cash out to reclaim treasury funds into an arbitrary wallet, rugging the treasury.

• 2.4 Setting the ruleset's weight

  A ruleset's weight determines how many tokens will be minted and distributed when a treasury receives funds. By default, a ruleset has the same weight as the one that preceded it after applying the preceding ruleset's decay rate.

  🟢 Used productively this can be used to manage how tokens are issued over time.

  🔴 Used maliciously this can be used to manipulate token issuance, and rug the treasury into an arbitrary wallet.

• 2.5 Adding a custom ERC-20 as the project's token, or deploying a new one.

  While adding an ERC-20 token isn't allowed, the project will issue token credits that are baked in to the protocol.

  If adding an ERC-20 is allowed, a project owner can bring their own ERC-20 that outstanding token credits can be claimed into.

  🟢 Used productively this can be used to create custom token mechanisms associated with a Juicebox treasury.

  🔴 Used maliciously this can be used to cut off a community of token holders from their treasury while using the cashing out of a new token to reclaim treasury funds into an arbitrary wallet.

• 2.6 Pause payments

  While payments aren't paused, the standard pay functionality will be accessible.

  If payments are paused to a project, the protocol will reject any inbound payments.

  🟢 Used productively this can be used to allow projects to creatively tune how its treasury can be accessed.

  🔴 Used maliciously this can be used to cut off a community of token holders from standard treasury functionality.

• 2.7 Custom treasury hooks

  If a project's rulesets have no data hook, pay hook, redemption hook, split hook, or ruleset approval hook attached, the consequences of each interaction with the protocol are predictable, consistent, and specified within these docs.

  If a project has attached one of the above hooks, the protocol will access information from them and call functionality within them at specific moments during the execution of various transactions within the regular operation of the protocol.

  🟢 Used productively this can be used to customize what happens when a treasury receives funds, what happens when the treasury pays out funds, under what conditions funds can leave a treasury, and under what conditions queued rulesets can take effect.

  🔴 Used maliciously this can be used to mint excess tokens, rug the treasury into an arbitrary wallet, trick users into compromising their individual wallets, create arbitrary unwanted and extractive behavior, brick transactions that should otherwise work, or introduce smart contract bugs into otherwise productive extension designs. Do not interact with a project that is using an untrusted hook.

• 2.8 Add and remove payment terminals

  While setting payment terminals isn't allowed, a project can only receive funds and offer token cash outs from within the payment terminals it has already attached.

  If setting payment terminals is allowed, projects can begin managing inflows and outflows of funds from new contracts, or remove current contracts where they are doing so.

  🟢 Used productively this can be used to create totally custom treasury behavior.

  🔴 Used maliciously this can be used to cut off a community of token holders from their treasury, create arbitrary unwanted and extractive behavior, or introduce smart contract bugs. Do not interact with a projects using untrusted payment terminals.

• 2.9 Add accounting contexts to a terminal

  While allowing new accounting contexts to a terminal, a project can start accepting new tokens as payments, using new tokens for payouts, and allowing new tokens to be reclaimed from the treasury from cash outs.

  🟢 Used productively this can be used to diversify a treasury's reserve asset.

  🔴 Used maliciously this can be used to cut off a community of token holders from their treasury, create arbitrary unwanted and extractive behavior, or introduce smart contract bugs. Do not interact with a projects using untrusted accounting contexts.

• 2.10 Setting the controller

  While setting the controller isn't allowed, a project can only operate according to the rules of its currently set controller.

  If setting the controller is allowed, projects can bring new rules according to which it'll operate.

  🟢 Used productively this can be used to create totally custom treasury behavior.

  🔴 Used maliciously this can be used to cut off a community of token holders from their treasury, create arbitrary unwanted and extractive behavior, or introduce smart contract bugs. Do not interact with a projects using an untrusted controller.

• 2.11 Migrating funds between terminals

  While migrating funds between terminals isn't allowed, a project's funds in a terminal cannot be migrated to another terminal which may have alternate constraints.

  If migrating funds between terminals is allowed, a project can move its funds from one terminal to another.

  🟢 Used productively this can be used to move a treasury into a totally custom environment, or to trusted upgraded versions of the protocol.

  🔴 Used maliciously this can be used to cut off a community of token holders from their treasury, create arbitrary unwanted and extractive behavior, or introduce smart contract bugs.

• 2.12 Cross-chain risk

  If a project is operating using V4's cross-chain utilities (called Suckers), it should make sure its rulesets have a data hook added that allow its funds to be transfered from one network to another without incurring the cash out bonding curve.

  🟢 Used productively this can be used to synchronize a project's dynamics across several blockchains, allowing it to receive funds and operate widely.

  🔴 Used maliciously this can be used to cut off a community of token holders from their treasury, create arbitrary unwanted and extractive behavior, or introduce smart contract bugs.

• 2.13 Multi-hook risks

  If a project is using multiple individually trusted extensions or terminals, there's a chance they could affect one another in a way that requires re-auditing expectations.

  For example, if a Swap Terminal is used alongside the 721-hook, credits cannot be used to mint NFTs. See this audit finding for more information.

• 2.14 721-hook cash out risk

  If a project is using the 721-hook for cash outs, it likely also wants to have made sure outstanding NFTs map cleanly to underlying treasury funds. Otherwise, NFT may be able to access more.

  🟢 Used productively this can be used to allow a treasury to issue NFTs when it receives funds, and offer refunds or access to the treasury according to expected rules.

  🔴 Used maliciously this can be used to cut off a community of token holders from their treasury, or create arbitrary unwanted and extractive behavior.

• 2.15 Buyback-hook pool risk

  If a project is using the buyback-hook, it must choose a fee option for a pool which it cannot change afterwards without using a new buyback hook during a subsequent ruleset. This limits a project owner from forcing issuance instead of buybacks by switching to a low-liquidity pool in real time, but may also prevent buybacks going to a pool with deeper liquidity if it's not the one programmed into the hook. The expectation is that liquidity will form around the pool that is guarenteed to be used for buybacks.

• 2.16 Identitcal locked splits risk

  If a project includes two identical splits that are both locked, only one lock will be honored. To fulfill the same intent, the project should instead combine the two splits into one locked split.

3. Price oracle risk

The protocol uses price oracles to normalize prices throughout the its standard operations. These oracles are smart contract mechanisms external to the core Juicebox protocol. Projects using multiple currencies for certain functionality bare the risk of these external oracle systems misreporting price values, or halting all together. To avoid this risk, projects should account distribution limits in the same currency as the token being collected. -->